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[So F No. 17550. In Bank. May 6, 1949.] 
EDWARD M. DUHTNETT, Appellant, v. ELLIJAH D. 
KING et a1., Respondents. 
(1] Judgments-Default Judgments-Relief Granted.-ln view of 
the mandatory language of Code Civ. Proc., § 580, that the 
relief grll.nted plaintiff following a default cannot exceed that 
which he demands in the complaint, a default judgment in a 
divorce case which adjudicates property rights in the absence 
of d~mand therefor in the complaint is void as in excess of 
the court's jurisdiction and is not res judicata on that issue. 
(2] Id.-Default Judgments-Relief Granted.-The essence of the 
policy underlying Code Civ. Proc., § 580, is that, in default 
cases, defendant must be given notice of what judgment may 
be take:l against him, and where a judgment other than that 
which is demanded is taken against him, he has been deprived 
of his day in court, that is, of his right to a hearing on the 
matter adjudicated. 
[S] Id.-ResJudicata-Matters not in Issue.-A judgment is not 
res judicata as to issues that are not or could not be litigated. 
[4] Dlvorce-Judgment-Res Judicata-Property Righta.-A judg-
ment in Ii divorce action awarding the community property to 
the wife, after the husband's default, was not res judicata of 
his interest in the property where, although the complaint 
alleged the existence of community property, consisting of 
the home and certain other items, it did not demand an award 
[1] See 14 Cal. Jur. 906; 31 Am.Jur. 131 . 
. McK. Dig. References: [1,2] Judgments, § 58; [3] Judgment., 
1400 j [4J Divorce, § 134. 
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of su .. h property, but asked that the husband's violence be 
restrained and that he be ordered to stay away from the "home 
of plaintiff and defendant." and for genera] relief. 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San 
Mateo County. Aylett R. Cotton. .J udge. Reversed 
Action to quiet title to an undivided one-half \Uterest in 
real property. Judgment for defendants reversed. 
Robert E. Hatch for Appellant. 
Royal E. Handlos for Respondents. 
CARTER, J.-By this action plaintitl' seeks to quiet his 
title to an undivided one-half interest in certain real property 
which was admittedly the community property of himself and 
his former wife, Marion Burtnett. On the 21st day of July. 
1945. she instituted an action for divorce against him in San 
Mateo County and he was personally served with summons. 
He defaulted therein. and the divorce decree awarded said 
community property to his wife. She subsequently conveyed 
said property to defendants. [n the instant action no con-
tention is made tllat plaintiff has estopped himself from ques-
tioning the validity of the award of community property. 
and there is nothing in the record from which it can be said 
that the doctrine of estoppel is applicable to the situation 
here involved. Defendants interposed the plea of res judicata. 
and the judgment in their favor is based solely upon the 
ground that the divorce decree awarding the community prop-
erty to the wife is res judicata of her ownership of the t:tle to 
said property in severalty. To ascertain the propriety of 
allowing that defense 'fe must examine the pleadings in the 
divorce action. 
In that action plaintift' wife claimed extreme cruelty, and 
the only reference to property rights in her complaint was 
the allegation that C C the community property of plaintiff and 
defendant consists of the interest of plaintiff and defend~:.Dt 
in the real property and dwelling house . . ." in San Mateo 
County. In the prayer there was no mention of the com-
munity property or request that it be awarded to anyone. 
There was 8 request for an order restraining the husband 
"from being upon or at the home" which plainly referred to 
an allegation in the complaint that he was molesting and 
harassing her. There was a prayer for general relief. 
[1] The statutes are very !'IpPC'ific in their requirements 
for a judgment following a default. 'c The relief granted to 
l\lay J!l-t9] DURTNETT v. KlS"O 
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the plaintiff, if there be no answer, cannot exceed, that whieh 
he shall have demanded in his complaint j but in any other 
casc, the court may grant him any relief consistent with 
thl! case made by the complaint and embraced within the 
issue." [Emphasis added.] (Code Civ. Proc., § 580.) In 
cases where no answer has been filed and a default has been 
entered, but the clerk may not enter a default judgment, the 
plaintiff may apply to the court "for the relief demanded in 
the complaint" and after evidence is heard, the court may ren-
der a default judgment "for such sum (not exceeding the 
amount stated in the complaint), as appears by such evidence 
to be just." [Emphasis added.] (Code Civ. Proc., § 585(2).) 
Manifestly "demanded" means claimed, asserted a right to 
or prayed for. That there was no demand for the property 
in the instant case is plain j that is, not only did the relief 
accorded exceed the demand, it adjudicated property rights 
when none were ever asserted, claimed or prayed for. 
It is equally clear that by reason of the mandatory language 
of the statute (the court cannot give a default judgment in 
excess of the demand), the court's jurisdiction to render 
default judgments can be exercised only in the way authorized 
by .~tatute. It cannot act except in a particular manner, that 
is, by keeping the judgment within the bounds of the relief 
demanded. It has been held repeatedly, and recently, that 
where a statute requires a court to exercise its jurisdiction 
in a particular manner, follow a particular procedure, or snh-
ject to certain limitations, an act beyond those limits is in 
excess of its jurisdiction. (See Tabor v. Superior Court, 28 
Ca1.2d 505 [170 P.2d ~67) j Lord v. Superior Court, 27 Ca1.2d 
855 [168 P.2d 14] ; Redlands etc. Sch. Dist. v. Superior C01trt, 
20 Ca1.2d 348 [125 P.2d 490] ; Abelleria v. District Court of 
Appeal, 17 Ca1.2d 280 [109 P.2d 942, 132 A.L.R. 715] ; For-
ten bury v. Superior Court, 16 Ca1.2d 405 [106 P.2d 411J; 
Evans v. Superior Court, 14 Ca1.2d 563 [96 P.2d 107] ; Rod-
man v. Superior Court, 13 Cal.2d 262 [89 P.2d 109] ; Spreck-
els S. Co. v. Industrial Ace. Com., 186 Cal. 256 [199 P. 8].) 
Certainly no statutory method of procedure or limitation on 
power could be more clearly expressed than that set forth in 
section 580 of the Code of Civil Procedure, supra. Thus the 
court wholly lacked jurisdiction to render a judgment affect-
ing the community property, for there was no demand for 
such relief. Havlng no jurisdiction the jUdgment was not 
res judicata on this issue. It was void. 
) 
) 
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[2] The essence of the policy underlying section 580 of 
the Code of Civil Procedure, supra, is that in default cases, 
cefendant must be given notice of what judgment may be 
taken against him-a policy underlying all precepts of juris-
prudene;. llnd protected by our constitutions- If a ju(lg::>ent 
other than that which is demanded is taken against him, he 
has been deprived of his day in court-a right to a hearing 
on the matter adjudicated. In cases where the clerk may 
enter a default judgment, as distinguished from a default, 
he has no authority other than that conferred by the statutes. 
He must strictly stay within his statutory authorization and 
a failure to do 80 renders the judgment void. (Baird v. Smith, 
216 Cal. 408 [14 P.2d 749] ; Landwehr v. Gillette, 174 Cal. 
654 [163 P. 1018] ; Farrar v. Steenbergh, 173 Cal. 94 [159 P. 
707] ; Reher v. Reed, 166 Cal. 525 [137 P. 263, Ann.Cas. 1915C 
737] ; Orossman v. Vi1lienda Water 00., 136 Cal. 571 [G9 P. 
220] ; Wharton v. Harlan, 68 Cal. 422 [9 P. 727] ; Junkans v. 
Bergin, 64 Cal. 203 [30 P. 627]; Tregambo v. Oomanche 
M. (f M. 00., 57 Cal. 501; Providence Tool 00. v. Prader, 32 
Cal. 634 [91 Am.Dec. 598]; Kelly v. Van Austin. 17 Cal. 564; 
Potts v. Whitson. 52 Cal.App.2d 199 [125 P.2d 947] ; Crofton 
v. Young, 48 Cal.App.2d 452 [119 P.2d 1003] ; Spaulding (f 
Co. v. Chapin, 37 Cal.App. 573 [174 P. 334] ; 158 A.L.R. 1091. 
1114; 14 Cal.Jur. 893.) True, the courts in those cases spl~ke 
of the ministerial character of the clerk's function, but the 
policy there enunciated is based upon the necessity of nutice. 
It is clear that the lack of it is as grave to defendant whether 
the clerk or the court renders the default judgment. 
It is a settled rule, and has been clearly stated in many 
recent authorities, that la default judgment by the court that 
exceeds the demand or gives relief where no demand is rr.ade 
therefor is void as in excess of the court's jurisdiction and OQt 
res judicata. (Langv. Lang, 182 Cal. 765 [190 P. 1~1]; 
Metropolitan Life 1m. Co.v. Welch, 202 Cal. 312 [260 P. 
545] ; Gregg v. Stark, 128 Cal.App. 434 [17 P.2d 766] ; Balaam 
v. Perazzo, 211 Cal. 375 [295 P. 330] ; Horton v. Horton, 18 
('al.2d 579 [116 P.2d 605].) It is said in Lang v. Lang, supra, 
Ilt page 768, where the divorce decree adjudicated community 
property rights where none were mentioned in the pleacing:;: 
"The defendant in that action (plaintiff here) had the right 
to assume that the judgment which would follow a oefault 
on her part would embrace only the issues presented by the 
complaint and the relief therein prayed. • • • 
) 
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.. Pal'tif'S to anactioll for tfivlm~e lIIay lo;llhmit t.o the court 
the simple issue of their right t.o a divorce without referellce 
to their property; (Coats v. Coats, 160 Cal. 671 [36 L.R.A.N.S. 
844. 118 P. 4411.) This being so, where a complaint in di-
vorcl' contains no allegation with reference to property rights, 
a IIt'fnulting defendant should be entitled to assume that the 
only matter which will be determined by the court is the 
matter of divorce, and that the question of property rights 
will be left for consideratinn aHd determination in another 
and separate action. In addition thereto, it is a well-t'.stab-
Iishedrule that in a default case the relief granted cannof 
exceed the prayer. (Brook, v. Poring'on, 117 Cal. 219 [48 P. 
10i3); Mudge v. Steinhart, 78 Cal. 34 [12 Am.St.Rep. 17, 
20 P. 147].) And where relief ilgil1en beyond the scope of 
that asked for, if u a nullify, and may be attacked coUaterally, 
or its effect al10ided under the doctrine that it is not reI judi-
cata." [Emphasis atlned.] And in Horton v. Horton, IUpra, 
at page 5~3: ""TJlile all these cases [referring to Lang v. 
Lang, IUpra, antI others] correctly state the rule that in such 
circumstances the aUowance of relief beyond the scope of the 
pleading iI a nullity, for a defendant has the right to assume 
that the judgment which would follow a default on his part 
would enlbrace only the issues presented by the complaint 
an,l the relief therein asked, these authorities are not in point 
here because the wife's plea(ling amply sustains the amended 
decree as rendered." [Emphasis added.] 
Some cases have said that the judgment is erroneous. (Bat-
four-fhlfhrie Inl1. Co. v. Sawday, 133 Cal. 228 (65 P. 400]; 
Longmaid v. Coulter, 123 Cal. 208 [65 P. 791] ; Poley v. Poley, 
120 Cal. 33 [52 P. 122, 651 Anl.St.Rep. 147] ; Gage v. Rogers, 
20 Cal. 91 ; Lattimer v. It yan, 20 Cal. 628; Mudge v. Steinhart, 
78 Cal. 34 [20 r. 147, 12 Am.St.Rep. 17] ; Burke v. Koch, 75 
Cal. 856 [17 P. 228] ; I'itts~urgh C. M. Co.v. Greenwood, 39 
Cal. 71; Parrott v. Den, 34 Cal. 79; Dar.ie v. Darne, 49 Cal. 
App.2c1 491 [122 P.2d 64]; Plores v. Smith, 47 Cal.App.2d 
253 [117 P.2d 712] ; Von Der Kuhlen v. Hegel, 51 Cal.App. 
416 [196 r. 913]; William. v. Reed, 43 Cal.App. 425 [Id5 
P.2cl 5151; Brown v. Caldwell, 13 Cal.App. 29 [108 P. 874] ; 
aee,.merely reversed, Sal1. ct Loan Society v. Horton, 63 Cal. 
105.) But none of those cases decided or found it necessary 
to decide that the judgment was not void. 
The cases of ]Jowman v. Bowman,29 Ca1.2d 808 [178 P.2tI 
751, 170 A.L.l(,. 246], Miller v. Superior Co-urt, 9 Cal.2c1 733 
) 
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[72 P.2d R68], Karlslyst v. Frazier, 213 Cal. 377 [2 P;2< 
362], Parker v. Parkef', 203 Cal. 787 [266 P. 283), and Cohe'; 
v. Cohen, 150 Cal. 99 [88 P. 267, 11 Ann.Cas. 520], are. not 
in point for the reason that there, support money or alimony 
was involved, and it may be conceded that this issue is so 
germane to the issue of divorce that a defendant must antici-
pate an award therefor although there is no prayer to that 
effect. Those eases involved awards of alimony or support 
for children. In the Bowman ease it was alleged in the com-
plaint that the husband and wife owed specific debts and re-
quested that defendant husband be ordered to pay the debts. 
That request was granted in the judgment. In the Miller 
case the prayer requested that an agreement which contained 
a provision for alimony be made a part of the decree. The 
Karlsylst case involved support of a child and while perma-
nent support was given the prayer asked for temporary sup-
port only. In the Parker case the weekly earnings of de-
fendant husband was alleged, the custody of the child re-
quested and the child was shown to be of tender years, and in 
the Cohen case the holding was based on the ground that the 
award of alimony was a necessary part of the proceeding. 
It is conceded, as it must be, that it is erroneous to grant 
relief in excess of the demand, as all the cases hold to that 
effect. If it is error, it must be for the reason that the judg-
ment violates section 580 of the Code of Civil Procedure, and 
that the violation consists in attempting to adjudicate matters 
beyond the issues made by the complaint. The only issues 
that may be litigated in a default proceeding are those pre-
sented by the complaint. As to other issues, those are not 
and cannot be litigated or adjudicated. [3] It has long 
been settled that ~ judgment is not res judicata as to issues 
that are not or could not be litigated. In English v. English, 
9 Cal.2d 358, 363 [70 P.2d 625, 128 A.L.R. 467], this court 
quotes with approval from Corpus Juris: "The doctrine of 
conclusiveness of judgments applies to a. judgment by default 
with the same validity and force as to a judgment· rendered 
upon a trial of issues, provided such judgment is regular and 
valid, and shows distinctly on what count or cause of action 
it was rested. But the confession implied from the default is 
limited to the material issuable facts which are well pleaded 
in the declaration or complaint, and does not apply to issue. 
which were not raised in the pleadings. Nor, subject to the 
rule that the judgment is conclusive as to every fact necessary 
to uphold it, is a default judgment conclusive, in a subsequent 
May 1949] BURTNETT v. KING 
[33 C.2d 805; 205 P.2d 657] 
811 
suit on a different cause of action, against any defenses de-
fendant may have, although the same drfenses, if pleaded anet 
proved in the former action, would have defeated plaintiff's 
recovery, because in the absence of a trial and hearing in the 
first suit, it cannot be said that such matters were adjudicated 
therein .• , 
[4:] In the divorce action here involved no notice was given 
to the husband that the community property would be adjudi-
cated. The prayer did not demand an award of such property. 
It made no mention of it at all. It may be observed that the 
complaint alleged that said husband would inflict bodily in-
jury upon plaintiff unless restrained. The prayer asked that 
such violence be restrained, and incidentally, to carry out that 
purpose, that he be ordered to stay away from the "home of 
plaintiff and defendant." Rather than advising the husband 
that the rights in the home would be adjudicated, the clear 
implication is that it was conceded that the property was the 
home of both, and would remain such, but that the husband 
should not go there during the pendency of the action. The 
only reasonable interpretation of the pleading is that the wife 
was not going to claim the home as hers, and she was recog-
nizing her husband's interest therein. The only prayer that 
could possibly be said to embrace a demand for the property 
was a general prayer for such other relief as may be proper. 
It is clear that the husband had no notice or warning that the 
property would be affected by a default judgment. On the 
1'. contrary, as above seen, the only indication was otherwise, and 
~.. in addition, by reason of his wife'8 silence on the subject in 
t ~ her prayer, he would properly assume that the rights to the 
~. property were not to be litigated in that action. To hold 
t:j~ otherwise would mean that this court sanctions a procedure t.,· under which a defendant may be trapped by a default judg-
~:1,r;ment. Merely alleging that the property was community in 
If::' no way challenged his right to retain his interest therein. 
" Rather it admitted he should. He would feel wholly safe in 
agreeing to that allegation without any thought that his in-
terest in the property was in jeopardy. Under such circum-
stances the default judgment could Dot be res judicata of 
" his interest in the property. 
~ti~· The judgment is reversed. 
~:.<: 0 
~. j Shenk, J., Traynor, J., and Scbauer, J., concurred. 
i,;; EDMONDS, J .-Unquestionably, in a default action, the 
l'i~ court may Dot grant relief beyond tbat whicb is demanded 
) 
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in the complaint. (Code Civ. Proc., § 580.) But a judgment 
in excess of the prayer of the complaint is not necessarily 
void and thereby. subject to collateral attack. Only to the 
extent that it includes a subject matter not embraced within 
the pleadings, is the judgment void. Where the subject matter 
is bef')re the court by appropriate allegations of the com-
plaint, a judgment which exceeds the demands of the prayer 
is erroneous and subject to direct, but not collateral, attack. 
In an action where the jurisdiction of the court depends 
upon the amount of the "demand," ordinarily the prayer is 
determinative of the question. (Miller v. Carlisle, 127 Cal. 
327 [59 P. 785] ; and see Becker v. Superior Oourt, 151 Cal. 
313 [90 P. 689J.) But the right to adjudicate does riot always 
depend upon the measure of the relief sought; it may be 
"found in the nature of the case as made by the complaint." 
(Silverman v. Greenberg, 12 Cal.2d 252,254 [R3 P.2d 293].) 
As stated in section 1917 (If the Code of Civil Procedure: "The 
jurisdiction sufficient to sustain a recorl1 is jurisdiction over 
the cause, over the parties, and over the thing, when a specific 
thing is the subject of the judgment." 
The case of Horton v. Horton, 18 Cal.2d 579 [116 1'.2d 605], 
is directly in point here and should be controlling. That was 
an action for separate maintenance in which the plaintiff had 
alleged the exi.. .. tence of community property, describing it, 
and the husband's ability to pay for her support. The prayer 
requested" a reasonable sum" for that purpose, as well as for 
attorneys' fees and costs, and for an order restraining dissi-
pation of the assets by the husband. The decree requir\Jd the 
husband to pay specified amounts to her for her separate 
maintenance, and she also was awarded certain property ne-
scribed in the complaint. Upon co11ateral attack, this court 
held that the allegafions as to the ability of the husband to 
pay support and the itemization of the community property 
•• were sufficicnt to notify him that the disposition of the com-
munity property and his ability to make the payments re-
quested were issuable facts." (Horton v. Horton, supra, 
p.583.) 
In the present case, although the complaint did not con-
tain a specific prayer for a division of community pri'perty, 
there were allegations sufficient to bring it within the rule 
of the Horton rase. Paragraph V of the divorce complaint 
real18: "That the community property, ... consists of the 
interest of plaintiff an;} defeniiant in the real property antI 
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County of San Mateo, State of ('ltlifurnia, 011(' ( 1) (,,,ok l'trwl', 
cash in the amount of One nundred Dollars ($lo(l.OO) and 
four United States Bonds of the maturity value of Twenty-five 
($25.00) Dollars each." This is not an allegation such as may 
be disposed of as a mere preliminary to the prayer for injunc-
tive relief; if this were the sole purpose of the allegation, why 
was there included the enumeration of the stove, cash and 
bonds' 
The majority opinion cOl1tains a striking anomaly. It is 
first stated in the most unequivocal tenns "that by reason 
of the mandatory language of the statute (the court cannot 
give a default judgment in excess of the demand), the court's 
jurisdiction to render default judgments can be exercised only 
in the way authorized by statute. . . . Thus the court wholly 
lacked jurisdiction to render a judgment affecting the com-
munity property, for there was no demantl for such relief. 
Having no jurisdiction the judgment was not res judicata on 
this issue. It was void." The rule thus stated would appear 
to be unswerving and final, and, incidentally, contrary to the 
rule of Horton v. Horton, supra. Yet at a later point the 
opinion demonstrates little difficulty in bending its rigid rule 
to avoid the inevitable collision with certain cases. (Bowman 
v. Bowman, 29 Cal.2d 808 [178 P.2d 751, 170 A.L.R. 246); 
Miller v. Superior Oourt, 9 Ca1.2d 733 [72 P.2d 868] ; Karl-
slyst v. Frazier, 213 Cal. 377[2 r.2d 362] ; Parker v. Parker, 
203 Cal. 787 [266 P. 283] ; Oohen v. Oohen, 150 Cal. 99 [88 P. 
207,11 Ann.Cas. 520].) Of these cases, it is said: They "are 
not in p(\int for the reason that there, support money or ali-
mony were involved, and it may be conceded that this issue 
is so gef'1'f!-ane to the issue of divorce that the defendant must 
anticipate an award therefor although there is no prayer to 
that effect." (Emphasis added.) Why this exception' If, 
88 the opinion states, the court's jurisdiction to enter judg-
ment in a default action is strictly limited to the "very spe-
cHic" terms of section 580 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 
how can a court be held to have .. jurisdiction" beyond the 
scope of the prayer in cases where alimony or support is in 
issue when the statute makes no mention of such an exception f 
It would seem, rather, that if the majority has properly con-
strued the statute, consistency requires that the support and 
alimony cases be overruled or disapproved. 
Nor is it clear why alimony is any more "germane" to an 
action for divorce than is community property. Ea('h of 
these issues is frequently, if not generally, determined in a 
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,livorce proceeding; yet, a divorce may be entered without 
a determination of either issue. Where, as here, there is an 
allegation listing all of the community property of the spouses, 
the husband is certainly on notice that the issue of property 
is "germane" to the litigation. If there is no prayer for 
division of the property, the decree which includes such 
division is erroneous but not void, if and to the extent that 
there is a proper allegation in the complaint to raise the issue. 
(Horton v. Horton, 18 Ca1.2d 579 [116 P.2d 605].) 
For these reasons, I would affirm the judgment. 
Spence, J 0, concurred. 
Respondents' petition for a rehearing was denied June 2, 
1949. Edmonds, J., and Spence, J., voted for a rehearing. 
